This passage is excerpted from Federalist Paper No. 5, published in 1787. In it, statesman John Jay discusses the potential effects of dividing the U.S. into several different nations.
The history of Great Britain is the one with which we are in
general the best acquainted, and it gives us many useful
lessons. We may profit by their experience without paying the
price which it cost them. Although it seems obvious to
common sense that the people of such an island should be but
one nation, yet we find that they were for ages divided into
three, and that those three were almost constantly embroiled in
quarrels and wars with one another. Notwithstanding their true
interest with respect to the continental nations was really the
same, yet by the arts and policy and practices of those nations,
their mutual jealousies were perpetually kept inflamed, and for
a long series of years they were far more inconvenient and
troublesome than they were useful and assisting to each other.
Should the people of America divide themselves into three
or four nations, would not the same thing happen? Would not
similar jealousies arise, and be in like manner cherished?
Instead of their being “joined in affection” and “free from all
apprehension of different interests,” envy and jealousy would
soon extinguish confidence and affection, and the partial
interests of each confederacy, instead of the general interests of
all America, would be the only objects of their policy and
pursuits. Hence, like most other bordering nations, they would
always be either involved in disputes and war, or live in the
constant apprehension of them.
The most sanguine advocates for three or four confederacies
cannot reasonably suppose that they would long remain exactly
on an equal footing in point of strength, even if it was possible
to form them so at first; but, admitting that to be practicable,
yet what human contrivance can secure the continuance of such
equality? Independent of those local circumstances which tend
to beget and increase power in one part and to impede its
progress in another, we must advert to the effects of that
superior policy and good management which would probably
distinguish the government of one above the rest, and by which
their relative equality in strength and consideration would be
destroyed. For it cannot be presumed that the same degree of
sound policy, prudence, and foresight would uniformly be
observed by each of these confederacies for a long succession
of years.
Whenever, and from whatever causes, it might happen, and
happen it would, that any one of these nations or confederacies
should rise on the scale of political importance much above the
degree of her neighbors, that moment would those neighbors
behold her with envy and with fear. Both those passions would
lead them to countenance, if not to promote, whatever might
promise to diminish her importance; and would also restrain
them from measures calculated to advance or even to secure
her prosperity. Much time would not be necessary to enable her
to discern these unfriendly dispositions. She would soon begin,
not only to lose confidence in her neighbors, but also to feel a
disposition equally unfavorable to them. Distrust naturally
creates distrust, and by nothing is good-will and kind conduct
more speedily changed than by invidious jealousies and
uncandid imputations, whether expressed or implied.
The North is generally the region of strength, and many
local circumstances render it probable that the most Northern
of the proposed confederacies would, at a period not very
distant, be unquestionably more formidable than any of the
others. No sooner would this become evident than the Northern
Hive would excite the same ideas and sensations in the more
southern parts of America which it formerly did in the southern
parts of Europe. Nor does it appear to be a rash conjecture that
its young swarms might often be tempted to gather honey in
the more blooming fields and milder air of their luxurious and
more delicate neighbors.
They who well consider the history of similar divisions and
confederacies will find abundant reason to apprehend that those
in contemplation would in no other sense be neighbors than as
they would be borderers; that they would neither love nor trust
one another, but on the contrary would be a prey to discord,
jealousy, and mutual injuries; in short, that they would place us
exactly in the situations in which some nations doubtless wish
to see us, viz., formidable only to each other.
The history of Great Britain is the one with which we are in
general the best acquainted, and it gives us many useful
lessons. We may profit by their experience without paying the
price which it cost them. Although it seems obvious to
common sense that the people of such an island should be but
one nation, yet we find that they were for ages divided into
three, and that those three were almost constantly embroiled in
quarrels and wars with one another. Notwithstanding their true
interest with respect to the continental nations was really the
same, yet by the arts and policy and practices of those nations,
their mutual jealousies were perpetually kept inflamed, and for
a long series of years they were far more inconvenient and
troublesome than they were useful and assisting to each other.
Should the people of America divide themselves into three
or four nations, would not the same thing happen? Would not
similar jealousies arise, and be in like manner cherished?
Instead of their being “joined in affection” and “free from all
apprehension of different interests,” envy and jealousy would
soon extinguish confidence and affection, and the partial
interests of each confederacy, instead of the general interests of
all America, would be the only objects of their policy and
pursuits. Hence, like most other bordering nations, they would
always be either involved in disputes and war, or live in the
constant apprehension of them.
The most sanguine advocates for three or four confederacies
cannot reasonably suppose that they would long remain exactly
on an equal footing in point of strength, even if it was possible
to form them so at first; but, admitting that to be practicable,
yet what human contrivance can secure the continuance of such
equality? Independent of those local circumstances which tend
to beget and increase power in one part and to impede its
progress in another, we must advert to the effects of that
superior policy and good management which would probably
distinguish the government of one above the rest, and by which
their relative equality in strength and consideration would be
destroyed. For it cannot be presumed that the same degree of
sound policy, prudence, and foresight would uniformly be
observed by each of these confederacies for a long succession
of years.
Whenever, and from whatever causes, it might happen, and
happen it would, that any one of these nations or confederacies
should rise on the scale of political importance much above the
degree of her neighbors, that moment would those neighbors
behold her with envy and with fear. Both those passions would
lead them to countenance, if not to promote, whatever might
promise to diminish her importance; and would also restrain
them from measures calculated to advance or even to secure
her prosperity. Much time would not be necessary to enable her
to discern these unfriendly dispositions. She would soon begin,
not only to lose confidence in her neighbors, but also to feel a
disposition equally unfavorable to them. Distrust naturally
creates distrust, and by nothing is good-will and kind conduct
more speedily changed than by invidious jealousies and
uncandid imputations, whether expressed or implied.
The North is generally the region of strength, and many
local circumstances render it probable that the most Northern
of the proposed confederacies would, at a period not very
distant, be unquestionably more formidable than any of the
others. No sooner would this become evident than the Northern
Hive would excite the same ideas and sensations in the more
southern parts of America which it formerly did in the southern
parts of Europe. Nor does it appear to be a rash conjecture that
its young swarms might often be tempted to gather honey in
the more blooming fields and milder air of their luxurious and
more delicate neighbors.
They who well consider the history of similar divisions and
confederacies will find abundant reason to apprehend that those
in contemplation would in no other sense be neighbors than as
they would be borderers; that they would neither love nor trust
one another, but on the contrary would be a prey to discord,
jealousy, and mutual injuries; in short, that they would place us
exactly in the situations in which some nations doubtless wish
to see us, viz., formidable only to each other.